# t/theory

## plans bad

### 1nc t-any

#### Interpretation: Neither side may defend that public colleges and universities ought not restrict a particular type or types of constitutionally protected speech.

#### In negative forms, “any” is indefinite—it doesn’t allow for exceptions

Cambridge Dictionary [Cambridge Dictionary, “Any,” <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/grammar/british-grammar/quantifiers/any>.] AG

Any as a determiner has two forms: a strong form and a weak form. The forms have different meanings. Weak form any: indefinite quantities We use any for indefinite quantities in questions and negative sentences. We use some in affirmative sentences: Have you got any eggs? I haven’t got any eggs. I’ve got some eggs. Not: I’ve got any eggs. We use weak form any only with uncountable nouns or with plural nouns: [talking about fuel for the car] Do I need to get any petrol? (+ uncountable noun) There aren’t any clean knives. They’re all in the dishwasher. (+ plural noun) Warning: We don’t use any with this meaning with singular countable nouns: Have you got any Italian cookery books? (or … an Italian cookery book?) Not: Have you got any Italian cookery book? Strong form any meaning ‘it does not matter which’ We use any to mean ‘it does not matter which or what’, to describe something which is not limited. We use this meaning of any with all types of nouns and usually in affirmative sentences. In speaking we often stress any: Call 0800675-437 for any information about the courses. (+ uncountable noun) When you make a late booking, you don’t know where you’re going to go, do you? It could be any destination. (+ singular countable noun) [talking about a contract for new employees] Do we have any form of agreement with new staff when they start? (+ singular countable noun) [a parent talking to a child about a picture he has painted] A: I don’t think I’ve ever seen you paint such a beautiful picture before. Gosh! Did you choose the colours? B: We could choose any colours we wanted. (+ plural countable noun)

#### Violation:

#### [1] Precision—three impacts

#### A] Predictability—their interp is grammatically unintuitive, which means it’s unpredictable since no one would expect it upon first glance of the topic.

#### B] Topicality rule—precision independently outweighs

Nebel ’15 (Jake, “The Priority of Resolutional Semantics,” 2/20/15, http://vbriefly.com/2015/02/20/the-priority-of-resolutional-semantics-by-jake-nebel/)

One reason why LDers may be suspicious of my view is because they see topicality as just another theory argument. But unlike other theory arguments, topicality involves two “interpretations.” The first is an interpretation, in the ordinary sense of the word, of the resolution or of some part of it. The second is a rule—namely, that the affirmative must defend the resolution.[2](http://vbriefly.com/2015/02/20/the-priority-of-resolutional-semantics-by-jake-nebel/#fn2) If we don’t distinguish between these two interpretations, then the negative’s view is merely that the affirmative must defend whatever proposition they think should be debated, not because it is the proposition expressed by the resolution, but rather because it would be good to debate. This failure to see what is distinctive about Topicality leads quickly to the pragmatic approach, by ignoring what the interpretation is supposed to be an interpretation of. By contrast, the topicality rule—i.e., that the affirmative must defend the resolution—justifies the semantic approach. This rule is justified by appeals to fairness and education: it would be unfair to expect the negative to prepare against anything other than the resolution, because that is the only mutually acceptable basis for preparation; the educational benefits that are unique to debate stem from clash focused on a proposition determined beforehand. The inference to the priority of semantic considerations is simple. Consider the following argument: We ought to debate the resolution. The resolution means X. Therefore, We ought to debate X. The first premise is just the topicality rule. The second premise is that X is the semantically correct interpretation. Pragmatic considerations for or against X do not, in themselves, support or deny this second premise. They might show that it would be better or worse if the resolution meant X, but sentences do not in general mean what it would be best for them to mean. At best, pragmatic considerations may show that we should debate some proposition other than the resolution. They are (if anything) reasons to change the topic, contrary to the topicality rule. Pragmatic considerations must, therefore, be weighed against the justifications for the topicality rule, not against the semantic considerations: they are objections to the first premise, not the second premise, in the argument above.

#### This comes first: 1] They have to weigh their offense against the benefits of *having a topic*. 2] I co-opt pragmatics first offense—we use pragmatics to compare between two legitimate semantic interps of the topic, but theirs isn’t even eligible for comparison.

#### C] Jurisdiction—judge is contractually obligated by the tournament to only vote aff if the resolution is proven true—means semantics first

#### [2] Limits—literally infinite possible types of speech. Arguments for every political position, insults, gossip, every different type of protest, strategic silence—they can hyperspec anything.

#### [3] Ground—their interp justifies unbeatable affs.

Eckert 16 [Eckert, Bennett. “Topic Analysis by Bennett Eckert.” Champion Briefs: Jan/Feb 2017. 2016] AG

This is potentially the most frustrating word in the topic. Merriam-Webster’s first definition of it is: 1: one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind: a: one or another taken at random ask any man you meet b: every —used to indicate one selected without restriction any child would know that8 It seems, then, that this “any” does mean something like “every” in this instance. However, that would not mean that the resolution is saying that colleges could restrict some, but not every instance of free speech. Rather, the topic intuitively seems to be saying that colleges cannot restrict any free speech; there should be no restrictions on constitutionally protected speech. The implication of this is obvious: plans are not topical. There also seems to be an obvious argument for plans not being allowed on this topic regardless of whether the word “any” was in the topic. If the affirmative were allowed to say “colleges should not restrict some specific instance of constitutionally protected speech”, then they would pick absurd, unbeatable affs. For example, people would read plans like “Public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict students’ right to write papers on Kant.” Or “Colleges shouldn’t restrict students’ right to say racism is bad.” All of these would, if the aff could specify one sort of speech, be theoretically defensible plans. However, they are clearly terrible for debate: they would force the negative into an awful position and give them no educational ground to debate about. For this reason, I will focus my discussion in the next two sections on affirmatives that defend the whole resolution.

### 1nc t-any v2

#### Interpretation: Neither side may defend that public colleges and universities ought not restrict a particular type or types of constitutionally protected speech.

#### The resolution passes the “almost test,” so “any” is generic.

Lallas 2/9 [Jackson Lallas, 2-9-2017, "A Defense of T-Any," Los Angeles Debate Intensive, <http://www.theladi.org/blog/2017/2/9/a-defense-of-t-any>] AG

A good rule of thumb for telling the difference between a universal and existential any is the ‘almost test,’ (See Carlson 1981, and Kadmon and Landman 1993). Almost can only modify universal determiners (Kadmon and Landman 1993). Consider: (3) Did you debate almost any debaters? (4) Almost any debater could win that round. We see that (3) is incoherent, but (4) still makes sense. (4) now has a smaller scope than (2), as some debaters would not be able to win the round. Using the almost test, it’s clear that our current topic is an example of the universal any: (5) Public colleges and universities ought not prohibit almost any constitutionally protected speech. Though awkward, this sentence has a clear meaning. It reads: “With a small amount of exceptions, constitutionally protected speech ought not be prohibited by public colleges and universities.” Since the resolution passes the almost test, we know that it uses any as a universal determiner. This demonstrates that the semantics of the resolution favor[s] a generic reading, as we would intuitively expect.

#### Prefer:

#### [1] It’s specific to the structure of the sentence, so it’s more specific. Make them read evidence that takes into account the resolution specifically.

#### [2] Common usage—if I say “don’t take any of my stuff”, I’m not saying that it’s ok for you to take some of my stuff.

#### Violation:

#### Standards:

#### [1] Precision—three impacts

#### A] Predictability—their interp is grammatically unintuitive, which means it’s unpredictable since no one would expect it upon first glance of the topic.

#### B] Topicality rule—precision independently outweighs.

Nebel ’15 (Jake, “The Priority of Resolutional Semantics,” 2/20/15, http://vbriefly.com/2015/02/20/the-priority-of-resolutional-semantics-by-jake-nebel/)

One reason why LDers may be suspicious of my view is because they see topicality as just another theory argument. But unlike other theory arguments, topicality involves two “interpretations.” The first is an interpretation, in the ordinary sense of the word, of the resolution or of some part of it. The second is a rule—namely, that the affirmative must defend the resolution.[2](http://vbriefly.com/2015/02/20/the-priority-of-resolutional-semantics-by-jake-nebel/#fn2) If we don’t distinguish between these two interpretations, then the negative’s view is merely that the affirmative must defend whatever proposition they think should be debated, not because it is the proposition expressed by the resolution, but rather because it would be good to debate. This failure to see what is distinctive about Topicality leads quickly to the pragmatic approach, by ignoring what the interpretation is supposed to be an interpretation of. By contrast, the topicality rule—i.e., that the affirmative must defend the resolution—justifies the semantic approach. This rule is justified by appeals to fairness and education: it would be unfair to expect the negative to prepare against anything other than the resolution, because that is the only mutually acceptable basis for preparation; the educational benefits that are unique to debate stem from clash focused on a proposition determined beforehand. The inference to the priority of semantic considerations is simple. Consider the following argument: We ought to debate the resolution. The resolution means X. Therefore, We ought to debate X. The first premise is just the topicality rule. The second premise is that X is the semantically correct interpretation. Pragmatic considerations for or against X do not, in themselves, support or deny this second premise. They might show that it would be better or worse if the resolution meant X, but sentences do not in general mean what it would be best for them to mean. At best, pragmatic considerations may show that we should debate some proposition other than the resolution. They are (if anything) reasons to change the topic, contrary to the topicality rule. Pragmatic considerations must, therefore, be weighed against the justifications for the topicality rule, not against the semantic considerations: they are objections to the first premise, not the second premise, in the argument above.

#### This comes first: 1] They have to weigh their offense against the benefits of *having a topic*. 2] I co-opt pragmatics first offense—we use pragmatics to compare between two legitimate semantic interps of the topic, but theirs isn’t even eligible for comparison. Topical version solves—they can defend whole res and read their offense as a specific advantage.

#### C] Jurisdiction—judge is contractually obligated by the tournament to only vote aff if the resolution is proven true—means semantics first

#### [2] Limits—literally infinite possible types of speech. Arguments for every political position, insults, gossip, every different type of protest, strategic silence—they can hyperspec anything.

#### [3] Ground— specific affs disproportionately kill neg ground.

Lallas 2/9 [Jackson Lallas, 2-9-2017, "A Defense of T-Any," Los Angeles Debate Intensive, <http://www.theladi.org/blog/2017/2/9/a-defense-of-t-any>] AG

Almost every neg position comes from one of three topic areas: hate / offensive speech, protest, or generic kritiks of free speech. The first is by far the broadest category, encompassing the hate speech DA, revenge porn DA, title IX DA, offensive speakers DA, alt right DA, anti-Semitism DA, counter-speech kritiks, positions about safe spaces, etc. Negatives occasionally read positions against protest, most prominently the endowments DA and heg DA. Lastly there are some kritiks of the concept of free speech itself, the cap K being the best example. That’s pretty much it. Despite the current topic’s broadness, my experience researching, judging, coaching, and looking through the NDCA wiki indicates that there are very few arguments beyond these in favor of negating[3]. Many arguments against free speech are already excluded because the resolution includes the words “constitutionally protected.” That’s not to say the remaining neg arguments are bad – some like hate speech are very well defended in the literature. What’s worrying is that in the big picture there are only a few ways to argue against free speech. These lines of argumentation quickly dissipate when talking about specific speech. This effect skews ground in favor of specific affs. The quality of neg ground is inversely correlated to the aff’s instead of roughly equivalent. Consider having to defend absolute free speech. There are good arguments in favor of it – the marketplace of ideas and individual liberty – but also strong counter arguments such as libel, hate crimes, and harassment. Now narrow that to constitutionally protected speech. The same market place and liberty arguments apply, but the objections have either disappeared or become much weaker. For instance, hate crimes and harassment have been narrowed to just hate speech while the libel objection is altogether gone. Now narrow it again to just constitutionally protected speech in college newspapers. I would argue that the ground in favor of this speech is even stronger than the ground favoring absolute or constitutionally protected free speech. Speech in newspapers serves vital, easily articulable functions such as the ability to criticize institutions, share events with other students, give people a voice, etc. These impacts are much more powerful and persuasive than the philosophical benefits of free speech in general. In contrast, the arguments against this speech are much weaker. There’s only a small link to hate speech style arguments about offensive publications and potentially a small link to kritiks of free speech. As the type of speech in question gets more specific, it tends to be much easier to defend allowing that speech than to raise arguments against it. Of course this does not hold when talking about libel or hate speech, but these counter examples aren’t relevant because affirmatives will only select desirable ground. Unless the aff makes a massive strategic error in selecting their advocacy text, plans under affirmative interpretation of T - Any skew the round heavily in favor of the aff. The ground argument thus far is still incomplete. It could be the case that specification is nec essary to offset bad aff whole res ground or general disadvantages to affirming. More specific variants of these arguments, such as the pics objection, will be covered in a later section. For now I’ll address this concern at the general level. First note that the work done above shows that the negative incurs a substantial ground loss when the aff violates T – Any. When comparing the difficulty of affirming to the limitation of neg ground, the neg comes out ahead. Affirming may not be easy but negating against these affs is too hard to justify the tradeoff. However, this objection needs to be covered in more depth. If the ground loss from violating T – Any turned out to not be that bad then the weighing argument would not hold. My next response to this argument is that the premise that whole res leaves the aff with bad ground does not apply. As a society we overwhelmingly favor free speech and there are years of defending it in the literature. Things like hate speech have been heavily covered through controversial Supreme Court cases in the past (Skokie comes to mind) and free speech on college campuses has been a big topic in the literature from the 90s to the present. It seems clear that the aff has plenty of arguments to choose from and also that there has been a dialogue among scholars which can help answer common negative positions.

### 1nc nebel

#### **Interpretation: Neither the aff nor neg can defend an advocacy that specifies an individual public college/university or a subset of public colleges/universities.**

#### **“Colleges and universities” are generic bare plurals, just like “just governments.”**

Nebel ’14 (Jake Nebel, “Jake Nebel on Specifying ‘Just Governments,’” 12/19, <http://vbriefly.com/2014/12/19/jake-nebel-on-specifying-just-governments/>) OS

To my ear, the generic reading is correct. I think the best evidence for this is simply the undistorted judgments of ordinary speakers. No competent speaker of English would, without distorting influence or additional evidence of generalizability, endorse an inference from a plan involving two just governments to the resolution. Suppose Sally, an American citizen, believes that the U.S. and Canada should require employers to pay a living wage, but that no other government (just or unjust, actual or possible) should. She would not represent her view by asserting, “Just governments ought to require that employers pay a living wage.” She would deny this claim and hold that the U.S. and Canada are exceptions.

#### Violation:

#### Standards:

#### [1] Precision—three impacts

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#### C] Jurisdiction—judge is contractually obligated by the tournament to only vote aff if the resolution is proven true—means semantics first

#### [2] Limits—their interp is ridiculous. 1845 public colleges and universities in the US—their interp justifies 1845 factorial affs which is more than the number of atoms in the universe.

### --- xt t-rule

#### Extend Nebel—every T shell implicitly contains 2 interpretations: one about what the topic means, and one that the aff should be topical, or the T-rule. They contest the T-rule by saying pragmatics over semantics, since they say we should overlook the actual meaning of the rez for pragmatic benefits. That means I access all reasons for why topicality is good as benefits to my interp. The topic is good—provides a stasis point of argumentation that equitably divides ground between both sides and provides a predictable basis for preparation. Controls a bigger internal link to every other impact like ground, strat skew, etc. and turns them since untopicality makes debate impossible.

### --- at: niemi

#### [1] Pragmatics turn the K—it’s impossible to negate against these plans so I had to read theory/T, but to make it persuasive I had to semantically justify it

#### [2] The problem is not in grammatical correctness itself. Dialects of English like AAVE also have systematized grammar systems, with correctness and incorrectness. We could not even communicate if we lacked any form of syntactical regulation. Our response should not be to do away with the concept of grammatical correctness but to regard every dialect as fully grammatically complete and legitimate. This is offense—your argument is patronizing since it assumes marginalized groups don’t also have concepts of correctness. Also proves no link—treatment of generic bare plurals corroborates across English dialects—you have yet to prove otherwise—so I’m not implicitly regarding “Standard English” as superior.

#### [3] Perm: reject every other imposition of a concept of grammatical correctness. They have to prove why this specific facet of grammar is offensive.

#### [4] I didn’t say the word “correctness” or read the part of Nebel that talks about competency

#### [5] Use evaluative modesty—the T offense still matters even if they win exclusion outweighs:

#### [A] Every instance rejection model is bad—there are always disparities. Even speed is exclusionary. Prevents us from ever actually debating which means we can’t access debate’s liberatory potential.

#### [B] Bad focus—prevents us from focusing on truly egregious instances of racism like white people saying the N-word or combatting structural inequalities like low black participation.

#### [C] Ruse of solvency—sends the message that voting on a quick 1AR voter is actually anti-racist activism.

#### [6] Essentialist—groups all white and non-white English with each other—creates an us-vs-them mentality.

## actor shit (bidirectional)

### must govt

#### Interpretation: The aff must defend federal legislation or a Supreme Court ruling that prevents colleges and universities from restricting constitutionally protected speech—the colleges can’t be the actors.

#### Violation:

#### [1] Multi-actor fiat—they defend all 1845 public colleges acting unilaterally, so they have 1845 actors. Impacts: A] non-reciprocal—every other debate advocacy is constrained by multi-actor fiat bad, so my CP ground is skewed. B] real world—1845 actors would never ever spontaneously do the exact same thing without some overarching body, plus we can never be in charge of every college at once unless we’re the government, so there’s no point in debating their aff. C] stable advocacy—neg PICs are either shifty or don’t solve—administrators won’t uniformly interpret terms like “hate speech”—that’s irresolvable.

#### [2] Ground—key to core generics like agent CPs and politics, also key to specific DAs that have actual impacts—their interp doesn’t solve since random policy changes on the level of individual colleges are unlikely to have large spillover ramifications. Generics outweigh since I can never prep out every single possible aff.

### must colleges

#### Interpretation: Aff can’t defend federal legislation or a court ruling—the actor of the plan text must be public colleges and universities themselves.

#### Violation:

#### Text—colleges and universities is obviously the actor of the rez since it’s the subject of the sentence. At best they’re effects T since federal policy just *results* in colleges doing stuff, but that’s not T in a vacuum and FX T infinitely unlimits the topic. Kills predictability—absolutely no way I could’ve known I’d be debating government policies on this topic. Wiki and solvency advocate doesn’t solve since there are hundreds of affs anyway.